Estimation of Cost Pass Through to Michigan Consumers in the ADM Price Fixing Case by Cotterill, Ronald W.
Food Marketing Policy Center
Estimation of Cost Pass Through
to Michigan Consumers in the
ADM Price Fixing Case
By Ronald W. Cotterill
Food Marketing Policy Center
University of Connecticut
Food Marketing Policy Center




Department of Agricultural and Resource EconomicsEstimation of Cost Pass Through to
Michigan Consumers In the
ADM Price Fixing Case
By Ronald W. Cotterill
Food Marketing Policy Center
University of Connecticut
Food Marketing Policy Center
Research Report No. 39
 November 1998





1.  Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 1
2.  Description of the Citric Acid and HFCS Marketing Channels .................................................................... 1
3.  Measurements of  Overcharges Paid by Direct Purchasers   .......................................................................... . 1
4.  Economic Analysis of Pass Through to Michigan Consumers ..................................................................... 2
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 2
4.2 The Actual Price Transmission Model .................................................................................................. 3




Table 1 Outline of Conditions Affecting the Incidence of  Cartelization: Graded on the Basis of
Feasibility and Necessity ..........................................................................................................................10
Table 2 How Consumers' Estimates Compare with Actual Prices ...................................................................11
Table 3 Pass Through Rates for Leading Soft Drinks ......................................................................................12
Table A1 Estimated Pass Through Rates for Soft Drinks ................................................................................17
Figure 1 The Relationship Between Demand and Curve Shape and the Pass Through Rate .............................13iii
Acknowledgements
This report is based upon an affidavit presented in a consumers class action lawsuit against the leading wet corn millers: ADM,  A.E.
Staley,  Cargill and  Haarman and  Reimer Corp.  I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Andrew Franklin in producing this
research report and the assistance of  Li  Yu Ma in developing the mathematical model and computing pass through rates.
Abstract
This report analyzes the economic impact of price fixing in the wet corn milling industry on consumers in the State of Michigan. Two of
the companies who produce citric acid have pleaded guilty to fixing its price.  In this report we assume that price fixing also occurred
among HFCS producers. Given the structure of the corn wet milling industry and the direct purchaser industries, the overcharge is
essentially uniform across buyers and selling arrangements.  We develop an actual economic model of price transmission based upon the
three facts: 1) The overcharge as a percent of the processed product value at wholesale and at retail is small, 2) Fixed proportion
technology, and 3) consumers have imperfect information about prices so a small price change has no effect on their purchase behavior.
These facts establish that 100 percent or more of the common overcharge will be passed through to consumers.
In a more general economic model, we analyze pass through when c onsumer demand is not perfectly inelastic. For different strategies
(profit maximization, sales maximization subject to a target level of profit, and loss leader strategies) and for different market structures
(competitive, monopoly, oligopoly), the rate of pass through is 100 percent or greater given certain documented characteristics of the
industries in this case.  Given the prior points consumer damages are the common overcharges for each commodity times the amount of the
commodity sold during the damage period. This is a lower bound estimate of consumer damages because pass through may well be greater
than 100%.
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  This report analyzes the economic impact of price 
fixing in the wet corn milling industry on consumers in the 
State of Michigan.  It is based upon an affidavit presented 
in a consumers class action lawsuit against the leading wet 
corn mil lers: ADM, A.E. Staley, Cargill and Haarman and 
Reimer Corp. These leading wet corn millers produce 
either citric acid, high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) or both 
products.    
  Citric acid is sold to detergent manufacturers for use 
rather than phosphates for e nvironmental reasons.  It also 
is used in the manufacture or preservation of food 
products and pharmaceuticals.  HFCS is also used in food 
manufacturing, primarily the soft drink industry.  
  Two of the companies who produce citric acid have 
pleaded guilty t o fixing its price.  In this report we assume 
that price fixing also occurred among HFCS producers. 
We will explain how one can measure the overcharge to 
direct purchasers (the food, beverage and detergent 
manufacturers), and explain how one can analyze pr ice 
transmission through manufacturers and through retailers 
and away – from – home food purveyors, such as 
restaurants to determine the amount of damage suffered 
by consumers.  
  The organization of this report is as follows.  Section 
Two contains a brief intro duction to the industries 
involved and the marketing channels for HFCS and citric 
acid.  Section Three covers the overcharge paid by direct 
purchasers.  Finally, Section Four analyzes the pass 
through of the overcharge to Michigan consumers.    
  Primary con clusions are:  
  –  Given that price fixing in the corn wet milling 
industry exists for citric acid and HFCS, the amount of 
the overcharge can be measured from business records or 
within the context of an economic model of the industry.  
There are sound econo mic reasons, given the structure of 
the corn wet milling industry and the direct purchaser 
industries, the overcharge is essentially uniform across 
buyers and selling arrangements.  
  –  We develop an actual economic model of price 
transmission based upon the  three facts: 1) The 
overcharge as a percent of the processed product value at 
wholesale and at retail is small, in most cases below 5 
percent for HFCS and often below 0.5 percent for citric 
acid because so little HFCS or citric acid is used in final 
produ cts;  2) Fixed proportion technology (i.e., a fixed 
recipe or formula) is used to produce a processed food or 
cleanser or pharmaceutical product; and 3) consumers 
have imperfect information about prices so a small price 
change has no effect on their purcha se behavior.  These 
facts establish that 100 percent or more of the common 
overcharge will be passed through to consumers.  
  –  In a more general economic model, we analyze pass 
through when consumer demand is not perfectly inelastic. 
For different strategie s (profit maximization, sales 
maximization subject to a target level of profit, and loss 
leader strategies) and for different market structures 
(competitive, monopoly, oligopoly), the rate of pass 
through is 100 percent or greater given certain 
documented  characteristics of the industries in this case.  
Given the prior points consumer damages are the 
common overcharges for each commodity times the 
amount of the commodity sold during the damage period. 
This is a lower bound estimate of consumer damages 
becau se pass through may well be greater than 100%.  
 
2. Description of the Citric Acid and HFCS Marketing 
Channels 
 
  HFCS is a sweetener produced in corn wet milling 
plants.  It is used in various food products, primarily in 
soft drinks which accounts for 71% o f its sales.  It is 
produced in two principle grades, HFCS 42 and HFCS 
55, which is the sweeter of the two.  The HFCS market is 
highly concentrated with the four defendants in this action 
which produced it accounting for approximately 90% of 
the U.S. marke t.  HFCS is a commodity, i.e., that 
produced by one manufacturer is treated as fungible with 
that produced by another.  Wet corn millers have a list 
price for HFCS but most of it sold below list price, 
particularly to the larger purchasers.  Food and bever age 
manufacturers incorporate HFCS into their products 
which they in turn sell to wholesalers (or larger retailers). 
Wholesalers sell the products to the retailers who sell to 
the public either in the "take home" market, i.e., grocery 
stores, or the "away - from - home" market, i.e., restaurants.  
  Citric acid is manufactured from corn by a 
fermentation process.  Anhydrous citric acid accounts for 
most production, but some is produced in liquid form.  It 
is used in soft drinks to make them tart in taste, to 
enha nce flavor and color in canned goods, in 
pharmaceuticals, and in detergents as a substitute for 
phosphates.  It, like HFCS, has a list price but is often 
sold at discount.  Its distribution channels are similar to 
those for HFCS.    
 
3. Measurement of Overcharges Paid by Direct 
Purchasers 
 
  The key question for this section is: if a conspiracy 
exists, would it commonly impact all direct purchasers and 
can that impact be measured?  A recent district court 
decision allowing a merger to occur in this industry i s seen Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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by some as evidence that this industry could not establish 
and maintain a common overcharge through a price fixing 
conspiracy. (CITE) In his decision that firms in this 
industry could not, even after the merger, successfully 
coordinate prices (collu de), Judge Vietor clearly did not 
mean to rule out illegal, conspiratorial actions.  Judge 
Vietor's explanation of how difficult it would be for firms 
to legally coordinate prices via tacit collusion (price 
leadership, price signaling, or other facilitatin g devices) 
actually provides an incentive to engage in illegal methods 
to elevate price.  As noted economist Douglas Greer 
writes:  
 
…only when cartelization is both  feasible and 
necessary to achieving the profit objective are we 
likely to find it, given a  hostile legal environment. 
When structural conditions are highly unfavorable, 
necessity and impossibility combine to produce 
competition.  When structural conditions are highly 
favorable, possibility and a lack of necessity combine 
to produce  tacit collusi on.  In between, necessity and 
feasibility blend, and cartelization is likely to occur 
(Greer 1992, p401).  
 
  Table 1 from Greer's text illustrates his logic.  Greer's 
conclusions are based on research by Fraas and Greer 
(1977) of 606 illegal price fixing c onspiracies from the 
records of all government actions brought to enforce 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act from 1910 to 1973 and Hay 
and Kelly (1974).  The wet corn milling industry fits most 
squarely in column 2 of Table 1.  Thus its structure is 
typical of i ndustries that have fixed prices in the past.  
  Since HFCS and citric acid are commodities, i.e., 
products that are fungible, buyers can purchase them 
from any of the five firms in the industry that produce 
them based on price differentials alone.  Prices i n the 
industry will vary by time, form (size of lot), location, and 
other external factors, but for a given level of these 
transaction characteristics, prices will be identical; 
otherwise there will be arbitrage between buyers and/or 
sellers in this indust ry, i.e., the purchaser whose prices are 
artificially increased will through various means find a 
way to purchase under arrangements which are cheaper.  
Therefore if sellers wish to elevate the prices via a price 
fixing conspiracy, the overcharge must be a  common 
increase to the price surface in time, form, and location. 
Moreover, the fact that the industry sells under a variety 
of contractual arrangements has no impact on the 
necessity in a successful conspiracy for a common 
overcharge. Since buyers can sw itch among the different 
arrangements, arbitrage will force a common overcharge 
to develop even if sellers want to discriminate among 
buyers by form of selling arrangement.  
  The presence of big buyers in the direct purchase 
industries is often cited as a r eason why sellers cannot 
successfully coordinate price  in a legal way  (tacitly 
collude).  This may be true, however, this point also 
increases the temptation to resort to extra legal means.  
By conspiring to fix prices via sharing information on 
transactio ns, setting market share targets, allocating 
customers, or whatever other explicit coordination 
method, the sellers in this industry are able to offset the 
power of the big buyers.  Also, the fact that big buyers  
shop around among sellers, even if they do n't share their 
final purchase prices with others, will ensure that any 
overcharge sustained by the sellers is a common elevation 
of the price surface.  Shopping around and not buying at 
particular prices conveys price information.  Conspiring 
sellers must  present a common price schedule to a buyer 
to successfully sustain the cartel price level.  
  Standard forensic economic methods can be used to 
measure this common overcharge.  First business records 
and pricing analysis conducted by the conspiring firms 
ma y readily provide a measure of the cartel's "success".  
Operation of a cartel will normally provide such records, 
if for no other reason than the normal business need to 
monitor profit performance and plan future business 
activity, including the setting of  the cartel's prices.  
Second, using a "before conspiracy" – "after conspiracy” 
implementation model, one can measure the increase in 
profits due to the conspiracy by controlling for changes in 
other factors that determine profits.  These models may 
be accou nting based or use econometrics, i.e. statistics, to 
estimate more complex relationships.  The end result is 
the same.  Based upon the documented structure and 
observed conduct of this industry one can estimate the 
common overcharge produced by the price f ixing 
conspiracy.  
 




  The question is how much of this overcharge will be 
passed on by food manufacturers to food retailers and the 
away – from – home food purveyors and how much will b e 
passed on by them to consumers in Michigan?  This issue 
of price transmission is not new to agricultural economics 
or economics.    
  Agricultural economists have focused considerable 
effort upon developing theoretical models and measuring 
how changes in f arm prices are transmitted through the 
marketing channel to produce changes in consumer prices 
(see Gardner 1975, Kinnucan and Forker 1987, Jacobson Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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1991).  Also real world experience confirms that pass 
through occurs.  New England dairy farmers, for examp le, 
convinced Congress in the 1995 farm law to allow them 
to legally cartelize the farm level price of milk through the 
Northeast Dairy Compact Commission.  Currently the 
Commission is proceeding to implement a 7.6 percent 
increase in the New England farm  level price of milk 
( Hartford Courant, May 28, 1997).  In opposition, 
manufacturers and retailers state that this price increase 
will be passed on to consumers.  Curtis Flynn, president 
of the Massachusetts Food Association, the state level 
trade associati on for food firms states:  
 
  Ultimately any increase in cost (of farm level raw milk) 
will be borne by the consumers. (Griffin Report, May 
1997, p84).   
  In economics, price transmission from commodity 
markets to consumer markets is closely monitored to 
gaug e inflation pressure.  An industry analyst in 
Supermarket News writes:  
 
  The Federal Reserve Board noted recently that  
ongoing declines in food prices should help slow 
inflation in 1997, barring any weather disasters.  
    According to the Fed's annual econo mic outlook, 
prices of farm products have dropped back from the 
highs of last summer, meaning that this year's rise in 
food prices at retail 'should be considerably smaller 
than that of 1996. (Owens, 1997, p38).  
   
It is impossible to avoid the general conc lusion that 
changes in commodity costs, including citric acid and 
HFCS, due to shocks such as cartelization or weather are 
transmitted forward through food marketing channels and 
have an impact on consumer prices.  
  Wet corn millers would suggest that since  food 
manufacturers and others use so little citric acid or HFCS 
in processed food, detergent, or pharmaceutical products 
that changes in their prices due to overcharges are not 
monitored nor considered important.  Wet corn millers 
would maintain  that ove rcharges are absorbed rather than 
passed on.  The very fact that most citric acid and HFCS 
are sold to very large buyers that go to great lengths to 
ensure that their procurement prices for these products 
are as low as possible disproves this assertion.  W hy 
would buyers be so aggressive if these product prices 
were unimportant to them?  If the price conspiracy 
elevated HFCS prices by only 1 cent per pound, then a 
"small purchaser" e.q. 500,000lbs., may pay $5,000 more 
for HFCS annually. A "large purchaser  who buys over a 
million pounds annually pays over $10 million more for 
HFCS.  Cost increases of this dollar magnitude simply do 
not fall through the cracks at any firm.  Moreover, cost 
increases due to price conspiracy are probably larger than 
1 cent per p ound (The monthly list price for HFCS - 55 
ranged from 14.25 cents/lb. to 27.0 cents/lb. during the 
1985 - 1995 period (USDA, 1996, p47).  A portion of this 
variation is due to factors other than the conspiracy, 
however, an effective conspiracy could account f or more 
than a one cent increase.).  
  A variation of the "through the cracks" argument 
misappropriates the fact that the price increase, especially 
for citric acid, is but a fraction of a cent for a single unit 
of many finished consumer products because so  little of it 
is used in the products.  One cannot falsely infer from this 
fact that firms cannot raise unit prices a fraction of a cent 
and therefore the increase in input price is absorbed by 
the direct purchaser or retailers.  This infinitesimal 
argument  is specious for two reasons.  First, under 
standard cost accounting practices, cost of inputs are 
summed to the total cost of production that the firm 
strives to cover.  The very reason for cost accounting is to 
make sure that all costs, including costs o n small 
ingredients as well as large, are measured and covered by 
the firm.  A firm that, for example, uses 100 ingredients 
that each contribute 1 cent to the value of the final 
product adjusts costs upward by 1 percent if 10 of these 
inputs have a ten per cent increase in cost.  This cost 
accounting procedure is no different than a firm with 10 
equal value inputs and one input's cost increases 10 
percent.  In this case total cost also increases 1 percent.    
     Second, food manufactures or retailers can var y the 
terms of sale and trade promotions to fine tune sales of 
hundreds of cases of the product to cover costs that are a 
fraction of a cent only when viewed on a per unit of 
product basis.  Retailers, for example, purchases 
truckloads of product at a time  under complex pricing 
arrangements ( Progressive Grocer, Dec. 1992 p.28).  
Retailers recover such cost increases by changing the 
length and depth of price promotions as well as by 
changing the everyday shelf price of the product.  
 
4.2 The Actual Price Transmission Model 
  In an economic model of price transmission, if one can 
document:  
  –  that consumers have imperfect information about 
retail prices of these products so that small price changes 
essentially go unnoticed and consumer purchase behavior 
does not  change,  
  –  then the fact that processed food, pharmaceutical, 
and cleaning products are produced using fixed proportion 
production technology,  
  –  and the fact that the monetary value of the citric acid Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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or HFCS used in processed products is very small rela tive 
to the retail value of the products so only small retail price 
changes result from the full pass through of overcharge  
  –  ensure that 100% of any overcharge for citric acid 
and/or HFCS will be passed on to consumers.  
  It is undisputed that 100 percent  pass through of 
overcharges for citric acid and HFCS produces small 
percent changes in consumer prices because their value is 
a small percent of the products' retail value.  One should 
not infer that there is no damage to consumers when retail 
price chang es on products with citric acid or HFCS only 
go up by a "small" amount so that consumers do not 
change their purchase behavior.  Consumer damages 
accrue to substantial amounts precisely because their 
purchases did not decrease and overcharge per unit 
aggre gates to tens of millions of dollars of damages when 
one aggregates across time and products.  According to 
Progressive Grocer, southern Michigan consumers in the 
Grand Rapids and Detroit market areas purchased 268 
million dollars of soft drinks for the 12  month period 
ending 10/9/94 ( Progressive Grocer, 1995, p.696, 698).  
  In this case, there are very strong reasons for arguing 
that all firms perceive their demand to be totally inelastic 
when considering the transmission of the conspiracy 
overcharge down t he food marketing channel to 
consumers.  If this is true, then one does not need to 
document constant returns to scale and constant supply 
prices for other inputs, and one does not need to address 
structural and strategic pricing issues since 100% price 
tr ansmission does not change consumer behavior.  All 
firms will maintain their prior profit level and continue any 
sales or loss leader strategies that were in play.    
  Publicly available studies that, for manufacturers and 
bottlers, the cost of HFCS by itse lf accounts for less than 
3% of net sales.  Thus, a 10% overcharge on HFCS 
would amount to less than a  0.3% increase in the cost of 
most regular soft drinks.  Given this fact, food firms can 
quietly fold this small cost increase into the general rise in 
pr ice that consumers expect due to inflation in the 
economy without causing them to change their purchase 
behavior.   
  Firms can pass on the overcharge with no fear of 
impact on their volume of shipments because consumers 
have imperfect information on food pr ices.  Consumer 
research studies have shown that consumers do not 
discern price changes of the  magnitude of the overcharge 
in this price conspiracy case.  Writing on information 
imperfections in local consumer markets, Maynes states:  
 
  ...many, perhaps mo st, local consumer markets will be 
characterized by substantial information imperfections. 
The 'culprits' behind this expectation are three.  First, 
there is the technical complexity and multi - component 
nature of products.  These factors make it difficult  for 
consumers to assess both quality and price accurately. 
 Second, there is affluence which has increased both 
the consumption possibilities and the consumer's 
information problem. Specifically, affluence has: (1) 
enlarged the number of average purchases  that each 
family can make; (2) enlarged the set of products, 
brands, models, retailers from which choices are to be 
made; and (3) increased the value of individual's time 
and hence reduced the extent of his shopping/search 
actions.  Finally, agricultural p roductivity and the 
automobile together have made urbanization possible 
and thus increased the set of products, brands, models, 
and retailers to which a consumer has access. Maynes, 
p77).   
  Progressive Grocer reports that on average only 29 
percent of shop pers who repeatedly buy a product could 
identify selling price within 5 percent of the actual selling 
price.  Among non buyers, on average, only 20 percent 
could place the price within 5 percent of current selling 
price.  Only 19 percent of shoppers, for e xample, know 
the price of Coca Cola within 5 percent of the actual 
price. Table 2 reproduces the  Progressive Grocer results. 
   
  Several other studies have examined the effect of 
increasing consumer information on food prices (Devine 
and Marion 1979, Devine  1978, Uhl et al. 1981).  These 
reports generally confirm that price levels and price 
dispersion among chains for individual products dropped 
when price information for several dozen products at all 
supermarket chains in a city was regularly published in t he 
local newspaper.  Devine and Marion report that price 
levels dropped on average 7.1 percent, with higher priced 
stores dropping prices more than lower priced stores 
(1979, p230) and that the mean dispersion in price 
decreased from 9.71 percent to 7.83 p ercent after price 
reporting (p232).  These changes were statistically 
significant.  The other research on price information also 
documents that consumers normally have imperfect 
information.  The 9.7 percent price decline and the 1.88 
percent reduction in  price dispersion reported by Devine 
and Marion are two measures of the degree of imperfect 
information.  This suggests that prices can vary from 1.88 
to 9.7 percent before consumers switch to other products, 
in this case other stores offering the same set  of products. 
   Recall that a 10 percent overcharge in the HFCS 
market produces only a 0.3 percent increase in the retail 
price of soft drinks.  Since 100 percent pass through of 
the overcharges in the wet corn milling industry produces 
retail price elevat ion well below the  Progressive Grocer 5 Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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percent and the Devine and Marion 2 - 10 percent range, 
there will be no change in consumer purchase patterns 
due to 100% pass through in this case.  In other words, 
consumer demand in the small range of retail price 
c hanges due to the conspiracy is totally inelastic.  This 
small price change phenomena can hold even when larger 
price changes generate changes in purchase behavior so 
that one can actually observe and estimate a demand 
curve that has elasticity (negative s lope).  In other words, 
the fact that one can estimate a retail demand curve that 
shows consumers are sensitive to large changes in price 
does not negate this small price change argument.   
  Another factor, unrelated to imperfect consumer 
information, that  also contributes to inelastic demand for 
small price changes is the fact that citric acid and HFCS 
are common cost ingredients to many products that are 
close substitutes for each other.  As Levy and Reitzes 
(1993) have shown, a joint increase in the price s of such 
products due to common cost increases because of the 
overcharge (or collusion) prevents consumers from 
substituting one product for another in this group.  The 
common cost increases elevate the prices of all products 
in the group, and consumers p erceive "inflation" in price 
of the general product category.     
  Given totally inelastic demand for small price changes 
and full pass through of any total cost increase, how much 
will total cost go up if the costs of citric acid and/or HFCS 
increase?  It  is undisputed that one has a fixed proportion 
"recipe" technology, one cannot substitute other inputs for 
citric acid and/or HFCS and maintain the constant identity 
and quality (taste, color, freshness, softness for foods, 
effectiveness for cleansers and p harmaceuticals, and 
environmental impact for cleansers). This means the 
increase in total costs equals the overcharge due to the 
conspiracy.  Part of the overcharge is not offset by 
switching to other inputs.  Thus firms that increase prices 
to cover the i ncrease in total costs are recovering the 
overcharge due to conspiracy.  
 
4.3 The General Price Transmission Model 
  Based upon analysis of the facts in this case, consumer 
purchase behavior is invariant to 100% pass through of 
overcharges for citric acid an d HFCS, however, one can 
analyze pass through under less than totally inelastic 
demand conditions as well.  When retail price increases 
are of a size that trigger reduction in consumer purchases, 
the analysis of pass through is more complicated.  Yet if 
on e has, in addition to fixed proportions, the fact that the 
prices of inputs other than citric acid and/or HFCS do not 
change when output drops due to higher retail prices, and 
one has constant returns to scale, then firm total costs 
increase by the amount  of the overcharge.  Furthermore, 
under commonly observed demand elasticity conditions, 
the structure of the market (competitive, oligopoly, and 
monopoly) and the pricing strategy of the firm (profit 
maximization, sales or market share maximization given 
an  acceptable level of profits) do not reduce the pass 
through rate below 100%.     
  A necessary economic condition for 100% pass 
through in the general model of price transmission is 
constant returns to scale (CRTS).  When CRTS holds, 
decreasing all inputs 1  percent reduces output 1 percent, 
not more, not less.  Connor et al. (1985) summarize 
research on economies of scale in food manufacturing at 
the plant and multi plant level.  The minimum efficient 
scale (MES) of a plant is defined as the volume that the 
plant must obtain to achieve constant returns to scale.  At 
smaller volumes than MES one gets more than a 1 
percent increase in output for a 1 percent increase in all 
inputs, i.e., there are increasing returns to scale.  Connor 
et al. summarize research fo r the 46 food manufacturing 
industries, writing:  
 
  only two industries had MES estimates over 10 
percent (of industry shipments);  Chewing gum was 
the extreme with 19.8%...One fifth of the industries 
had MES estimates over 5 percent of industry 
shipments.  (Connor et al., 1986, p94).    
Thus 80 percent of all food manufacturing industries 
attain constant returns to scale production level in plants 
that produce less than 5 percent of their industries total 
shipments.  Studies of multi plant economies for beer,  
cigarettes, and breakfast cereal by Scherer (1975, p334 -
335; 1982) indicate that multi plant economies of scale are 
not that great.  A firm with 2 or 3 plants exhausts them 
and therefore has constant returns to scale.  Other food 
industries are similar.   Therefore one can conclude that 
manufactured food products in the U.S. are produced by 
firms that enjoy constant returns to scale.  
  Since food products using citric acid and HFCS are 
manufactured in plants and firms with constant returns to 
scale, then out put reduction due to higher consumer prices 
does not affect the physical relationship between input 
and output.  The change in output cost, other factors 
remaining the same, is equal to the change in input cost.  
If products are produced in plants or firms  operating 
below MES, then when output decreases due to pass 
through of the overcharge, one also needs more of each 
input to produce a given output so that costs go up by 
more than the overcharge in citric acid and/or HFCS.  
Even if all other conditions po int to 100% pass through, 
pass through of the overcharge to total firm costs would 
be greater than 100% if firms are on the increasing returns Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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to scale portion of their cost curves.   
  The other production condition concerning the 
relationship of the overch arge to manufacturers costs in 
the general model is whether the supply price of other 
inputs used is constant.  There is a commonly 
acknowledged fact for most individual industries.  These 
food manufacturing industries use only a very small 
proportion of o ther inputs produced by the economy.  
One must be careful not to confuse this fact with the fact 
that a small amount of citric acid and/or HFCS go into a 
processed product.  Here one is focusing on that fact that 
a small amount of the total economy's labor , for example, 
goes into industries that use citric acid and HFCS.  Thus 
since small changes in the retail price of these products 
generate at most small changes in the quantity sold.  
There are only small changes in the demand for these 
other inputs, and  since these industries total demand for 
other inputs is very small relative to their total supply, 
there is no discernable change in the supply price of these 
other inputs when the overcharge is passed on to 
consumers.  Therefore, any increase in costs due  to the 
overcharge which reduces output is not offset by saving 
via lower prices of other inputs.    
  Given fixed proportions production, constant returns to 
scale, and elastic other input supply, a change in the price 
of citric acid or HFCS due to price co nspiracy produces 
an equal change in the total cost of the food 
manufacturing firms. Also, with constant returns to scale, 
average variable cost (total variable cost divided by the 
number of units produced) and marginal costs (the 
incremental cost of produ cing another item) are constant 
and equal to each other.  An increase in the price of citric 
acid and HFCS shifts these flat cost curves up by a 
constant amount that equals the increase in the price of 
citric acid or HFCS times the amount used to produce o ne 
unit of processed product.  
  Given that one has 100% price transmission of the 
overcharge to manufacturing firm costs, the next step is to 
ask how much of the cost increase in the general price 
transmission model is transmitted to the wholesale 
(manufact urers) price for the processed product?  The 
answer to this question depends upon three factors: the 
elasticity of demand for the firm's product, the market 
structure of the industry, and the pricing strategy of the 
firm.  
  Defendants in cases such as this  typically claim that 1) 
pass through is less than 100 percent in food industries, 
even if they price do maximize profits, because they are 
not competitively structured and 2) firms in food 
industries pursue strategies other than profit maximization 
and tha t these strategies somehow "overwhelm" the firms 
desire to recover cost increases through price increases.  
Harris and Sullivan (1979) provide the most complete 
analysis of price pass through under these different 
scenarios, however, it is not comprehensiv e.  In Appendix 
A, we expand their analysis and apply the results, as they 
suggest, to determine the rate of pass through under 
different elasticity, structural and strategic conditions.  
Readers desiring formal mathematical analysis of pass 
through are re ferred to the appendix.   
  If food manufacturing industries are competitively 
structured and firms maximize profits, then the rate of 
pass through of costs to wholesale prices is 100%, 
irrespective of the value of the market elasticity of 
demand.  The shift  up in the industry supply curve is 
equal to the shift in marginal costs and the new 
equilibrium wholesale market price is higher by the same 
amount (Harris and Sullivan, Figure 2 p. 284).    
  If the food manufacturing industry is a monopoly, 
demand for its  product is linear (i.e., the demand curve is 
a straight line, see Figure 1), and it maximizes profits, then 
pass through is less than 100%.  Harris and Sullivan 
stopped their analysis of noncompetitive market structures 
at this point leaving readers (incl uding defendants) with 
the implication that pass through is always less than 100% 
in such industries.  As shown in Appendix A this is not the 
case.  Harris and Sullivan's result depends upon the linear 
demand assumption.    
  If demand is nonlinear and the p rofit maximizing 
monopolist faces constant elasticity over the relatively 
small range of price variation that occurs due to the citric 
acid or HFCS overcharge, the rate of pass through is 
greater than 100%.   As this constant elasticity increases 
in value  (e.g. from 2 to 4 to + ¥) the industry is becoming 
effectively more competitive and the pass through rate 
decreases and converges to 100%.  A monopolist facing 
an infinitely elastic demand curve essentially is not a 
monopolist but a compe titive firm in a broader industry 
because any price increase causes buyers to switch to 
some other perfect substitute product.  
  If food manufacturing industries are oligopolies and 
each firm independently  maximizes profits (no collusion), 
the same general  result holds.  As the number of firms in 
the industry decreases, the pass through rate converges to 
the monopoly rate.  Therefore all firms in non 
competitively structured industries that face a constant 
elasticity market demand curve have a pass through  rate 
which is greater than 100%.  If one relaxes the constant 
demand elasticity assumption and allows demand to 
become more elastic as price increases, the pass through 
rate for profit maximizing monopolists and oligopolists 
decreases.  Figure 1 illustrate s how the shape of the 
demand curve affects the pass through rate.  There is 
some intermediate shaped demand curve (between linear Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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and constant elasticity) where pass through is 100%.   
  The key conclusion from this illustration is that one 
must know more t han the fact that the demand curve has 
negative slope.  (All curves in Figure 1 have negative 
slope.)  One must know its curvature as well.  
  Although economic textbooks use linear demand 
curves, empirically economists know that real world 
demand curves ar e nonlinear.  Often constant elasticity 
demand curves are estimated (e.g., Hausman 1994, 
Cotterill 1994).  Increasingly, however, flexible functional 
forms such as the Almost Ideal Demand System 
(Hausman 1994, Cotterill et al. 1996) are used to estimate 
no n constant elasticity demand curves.  From the 
standpoint of price transmission this is crucial, because it 
allows us to estimate a pass through rate that can range 
from zero to   ￿ rather than restrict it,  a priori, to the 
linear (less than 100%) or consta nt elasticity case (greater 
than 100%).  Using estimation results for the soft drink 
industry from Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (1996, Table 
A5, p57), I have computed the pass through rates for the 
top 7 brands and private label soda in the industry.  They 
are listed in Table A1 of Appendix A and reproduced in 
Table 3 below.  A market share weighted average for all 
of these brands produces an estimate of the pass through 
rate for this industry. It is 100%.   
  More generally it counters common sense to believe  
that competitive industries have more power to pass 
through cost increases than monopolies or oligopolies.  It 
suggests that economic power resides with competitive 
firms and that monopolies and oligopolies are victims of 
price fixers and market shocks th at increase their costs. 
Baumol (1972, p.327) explains that firms in 
noncompetitive markets will use non price strategies such 
as advertising to influence the shape of the demand curve. 
Other economists has also developed theories and 
documented that produ ct differentiation strategies 
influence consumer demand relationships (Scherer and 
Ross, 1990, Chapter 16, especially pp580 - 588).  Thus 
firms in oligopolies and monopolies ensure that pass 
through is 100 percent or greater.  If they can't do this, 
then the  industry would crumble into a competitive 
industry to ensure pass through.  This later phenomenon 
has not been observed in food industries.  In fact, seller 
concentration has increased (fewer firms with larger 
market shares) in food industries (Connor et  al. 1985, 
Franklin and Cotterill, 1993).  
  Food firms can pursue strategies other than short run 
profit maximization.  A firm may, for example, seek to 
maximize sales or market share given an acceptable 
(target) level of profits is achieved.  A loss leader  strategy 
is a special case where the profit level is negative.  
Defendants would often have us believe that this pursuit 
"overwhelms" a firm's desire to cover small input cost 
increases with price increases.  Using the model 
developed by Baumol (1972, p325 - 327), we show in 
Appendix A that firms will still pass through 100% or 
more of an increase in input costs.  This holds for firms in 
an oligopoly as well as a monopoly.  
  Now that we have shown that manufacturers pass on 
100 percent (or more) of this overch arge.  The remaining 
link in the price transmission process is to explicitly 
incorporate the away - from - home and food retailing 
industries into the model.  Away - from - home purveyors 
are straightforward because these firms operate in 
competitive markets.  Any  increase in their costs is passed 
through at the 100 percent rate in the general as well as 
the actual price transmission model. One cannot argue 
that consumers may buy affected products as part of a 
meal, e.g., catsup and tomatoes used to make chili, and  
that the restaurant may not pass through cost increases on 
components of a meal is not correct.  A restaurant is a 
firm with inputs and outputs just like the food 
manufacturing firm analyzed previously.  The same input 
cost analysis holds.  Increases in i nput costs for meals that 
have a 1) fixed recipe, 2) prices for other inputs that are 
not affected by output variation due to the price 
conspiracy, and 3) constant returns to scale, are 
completely passed on.  However, increasing returns to 
scale would incr ease the rate of pass through.    
  A similar analysis of the relationship between the 
wholesale price of products with citric acid and/or HFCS 
and food retailers' cost of supplying such products to 
consumers holds whether food retailers are competitive or 
o ligopolistic and whether they maximize short run profits 
or pursue market share or loss leader strategies.  Under all 
of these scenarios, pass through is 100 percent or higher if 
demand is totally inelastic due to imperfect information.  
In the general cas e where consumers demand is less than 
totally inelastic, we have shown that the weighted average 
pass through rate was 100% for soft drinks.  Moreover, 
that pass through rate was estimated using retail price and 
quantity data.  So it includes the combined  effect of 
manufacturers and retailers conduct.  
  There is one other distinct price strategy.  Retailers and 
manufactures may jointly cooperate and manage the food 
supply chain to maximize profits at a level above that 
possible with independent pricing by su ccessive firms in 
the channel.  Types of vertical coordination that achieve 
this increase in total channel profits are legal and are 
achieved through implementation of "category 
management" programs (Harris and McPartland, 1993, 
pp.5 - 8.).  Research on the  structure of food retailing 
channels has effectively established that food 
manufactures have market power (i.e., they can raise Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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prices above costs) and that food retailers also have 
market power in local market areas (see Connor et al. 
1985, Marion et al.  1979, Cotterill 1986).  In this 
successive "monopoly" situation, economists have shown 
that profit maximization by firms at the manufacturing 
level independent of profit maximization by firms at the 
retail level leads to less than maximum total channel 
pro fits.  Through vertical coordination via category 
management both manufacturers and retailers can 
increase their profits.  Moreover, this move lowers prices 
to consumers (Tirole 1988, p174 - 176, McCorriston and 
Sheldon 1997).  
  This strategy increasingly dom inates the trade press 
under the rubric of the need for improved trade relations. 
  Progressive Grocer's Marsh Super Study (December 
1992, p. 28 and Bennett, 1993, p. 89 - 92) explain how 
carbonated soft drink bottlers use trade promotions to 
improve channel  profits.  Price specials, loss leaders, and 
display articles are rotated through the category  to 
maximize category profit.  Gerstner and Hess (1991, p. 
872 - 886) in an  American Economic Review article titled 
"A Theory of Channel Price Promotions" present a  formal 
model that shows how the use of coupons distributed 
directly to consumers and trade promotions (price 
reductions including loss leaders, display, and local 
newspaper advertisements) can increase retailer and 
manufacturer profits.  From the standpoi nt of this case, 
the key question is, does this vertical channel coordination 
strategy "overwhelm" the incentives of manufacturers and 
retailers to pass on overcharges from the wet corn milling 
industry?  In fact, as is the case for horizontal monopoly 
and  oligopoly pricing games, the channel coordination 
game is independent of cost impacts on prices.  Gerstner 
and Hess state:  
 
  Costs of manufacturing, retailing, and processing of 
push [trade promotions] and pull promotions 
(consumer coupons) are all irrele vant for the 
arguments made below, so they are assumed for 
simplicity to be zero. (Gerstner and Hess, 1991, p. 
873)  
The ultimate conclusion is that the strategic game that 
retailers and manufacturers play, independently or 
cooperatively, is predicated upon  external cost and 
demand conditions.  The game does not influence them, 
nor does it under the conditions documented in this case 
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Table 1. Outline of Conditions Affecting the Incidence of Cartelization: Graded on the Basis of Feasibility and Necessity    
  (1)   (2)   (3)  
  Feasibility:   Feasibility:   Feasibility:  
Market   Exce llent; Need:   Good; Need:   Poor; Need:  
Condition or   Unnecessary   Helpful   Essential  
Characteristic   (Tacit Collusion)   (Cartel)   (Competition)    
 
Number of Firms   Very few (2 - 5)   Several (5 - 25)   Many (30+)  
Concentration Ratio   Very High   High - medium   Low  
Type of Produc t   Standardized   Slightly different   Differentiated  
Rate of Technological change   None   Slow - moderate   Rapid  
Frequency (and size) of sales   Frequent (small)   Often (medium)   Lumpy (large)  
Opportunity for secret deals   None   Some   Great  
Rate of Growth   Slow   Medium   Rapid  
Elasticity of Demand   Low (less 0.5)   Medium   High (2+)  
Production costs across firms   Identical   Similar   Diverse    
 
Source: Greer, D. F. 1992.  Industrial Organization and Public Policy, 3rd ed. New York: MacMillan Publishing Company. p. 403.  Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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Table 2. How Cus tomers' Estimates Compare with Actual Prices  
 
    % of Customers Identifying Correct  
                      Price Within  " 5%    
        Combined  
  Item   Buyers   Non - buyers   Estimates    
 
Marlboro cigarettes (Kings, carton)   71   36   44  
Land - O- Lakes butter (1 lb.)   54   41   48  
Scott Paper towels (1 roll, 100 sq. ft.)   52   34   49  
Fab detergent (giant, 49 oz.)   50   21   31  
Private label coffee (1 lb.)   47   20   26  
Private label fruit cocktail (16 oz.)   46   25   35  
Private label orange drink (46 oz.)   42   26   30  
Pillsbury Hungry Jack pancake mix (32 oz.)   41   14   24  
Carnation Evaporated Milk (13 oz.)   38   23   28  
Heinz catsup (14 oz.)   37   32   36  
Private label flour (5 lbs.)   36   20   25  
Private label bleach (1/2 gal.)   36   26   31  
Private label mayonnaise (qt.)   36   28   31  
Dole sliced pineapple (20 oz., 3 in.)   35   22   31  
Ivory bar soap (large, 9.5 oz.)   33   19   25  
Campbell tomato soup (10.75 oz.)   33   20   30  
Kleenex facial tissue (200 2 - ply)   3 3   23   30  
Domino sugar (5 - lb. bag)   33   32   33  
SOS soap pads (10 count)   32   10   27  
Private label canned milk (13 oz.)   31   16   19  
Morton chocolate cream pie   29   10   18  
B&M baked pea beans (28 oz. can)   28   19   24  
Breck regular shampoo (11 oz.)   28   20   23  
Kraft Miracle Whip  salad dressing (qt.)   28   29   28  
Del Monte fruit cocktail (17 oz.)   26   24   25  
Coca - Cola (8 - pack 12 oz. cans)   26   13   19  
Dixie cup 5 - oz. refills (100 count)   26   27   26  
Armour bacon (1lb. sliced)   25   21   24  
Tide XK detergent (giant, 49 oz.)   24   19   21  
Kraft Soft Parkay  margarine (1 lb.)   24   16   19  
Nestle Quik cocoa (1 lb.)   24   16   21  
Private label salad dressing (1 qt.)   19   20   20  
Crisco shortening (3 lbs.)   18   15   16  
Clorox bleach (1/2 gal.)   18   12   16  
Ken - L- Ration dog food (15.5 oz.)   17   12   13  
Private label apple sauce (25 oz.)   1 6   14   15  
Milk Bone biscuits (26 oz.)   15   9   11  
Green Giant Niblets corn (12 oz.)   15   17   16  
Pillsbury Best XXXX flour (5 lbs.)   14   28   24  
Private label frozen orange juice (6 oz.)   14   9   11  
Kellogg's corn flakes (12 oz.)   12   7   10  
Crest toothpaste (3 oz.)   10   11   11  
Ma xwell House instant coffee (6 oz.)   9   6   7  
Saran Wrap (100 sq. ft.)          8   21   13    
   Average of All Items   29   20   24  
Source:  Progressive Grocer, Nov. 1974, pp. 39 - 41.  Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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Table 3  Pass Through Rates for Leading Soft Drinks.  
    
Brand           Pass Through Rate    
 
Coke             107%  
Pepsi             93%  
RC             73%  
Dr Pepper             114%  
Sprite             98%  
Seven - Up             85%  
Mountain Dew           107%  
Private Label             110%    
 
Share Weighted Average        100%      
 
This table is based on results from Table A1 in Appendix A.  Linear Demand R L<100%
Intermediate Case R I =100%
Constant Elasticity Demand
RC>100%
Figure 1.  The Relationship Between Demand Curve Shape and the Pass Through Rate (R)
P
QEstimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
 
 





An alysis of Price Transmission (Pass Through) Under 
Different Behavior and Structure Conditions  1 
 
Case 1: Profit Maximization  
 
  Under this behavior assumption, a firm maximizes its 
profits which are equal to total revenue minus total costs.  
 
Cas e 1.1 Competitive Market  
 
  Harris and Sullivan (1979, p284) analyze the rate of 
pass through graphically for firms in a competitive 
industry. Their supply and demand curve analysis rest 
upon assumption that Kinnucan and Forker explicitly 
state.  The agricu ltural input is used in fixed proportion 
with other inputs and there are constant returns to scale.  
These conditions hold for the industries that use citric acid 
and HFCS because the recipe for a particular product 
requires a certain amount of these ingre dients.  That 
amount and the amount of other inputs necessary for the 
processing of a product do not vary for changes in the 
range of output under analysis in this case.  A 12 oz. can 
of Coke contains 39 gram of HFCS.  Given these verified 
assumptions, fol lowing Gardner (1975), Kinnucan and 
Forker (p290, footnote) define the down channel price 
transmission elasticity as the ratio of percent change in the 
retail price of a product, for example, that contains HFCS 
to the percent change in the price of HFCS du e to supply 
side shocks such as a price fix by wet corn millers.  Since 
we have fixed proportion production technology, the 
elasticity of substitution for HFCS with other ingredients, 
e.g., water, is zero.  The price transmission elasticity is 
then given b y:  
 







  (1)  
 
where:   
  E= the price change in retail price for a 1 percent 
change in the input price,  
  a S = the input industry's share of the consumer price,  
  b S = 1 - a S  = other inputs sha re of the consumer price,  
  b e = the supply elasticity of all other inputs,  
  h= the retail market elasticity of demand.  
 
                                                   
1   The assistance of Li Yu Ma is gratefully ac knowledged.   
  Note that if market demand elasticity in totally inelastic 
( h=0) then E= a S  and the percent change in the retail 
price equals  a S  times the percent change in the input 
price.  Using an example, if a product uses 1 pound of 
HFCS and if HFCS goes up in price from 20 cents/lb to 
24 cents/lb, a 20% increa se, and if HFCS costs are 5% of 
the retail price ($4.00), then the price of the retail product 
goes up (.2x.05=.01) one percent to $4.04.  When 
demand is totally inelastic, one has 100% pass through of 
the 4 cents/lb increase in HFCS price. (This is Harris  and 
Sullivan, Figure 2D).  
  Alternatively if the demand curve has negative slope, 
then  h￿0 but if  b e , the elasticity of supply of other 
inputs is infinitely elastic, then E= a S  and pass through 
also is  100 percent. (This is Harris and Sullivan, Figure 
2A). Infinite supply elasticity for inputs means that for the 
variation in output experienced in this case due to price 
fixing, the price of other inputs do not change. This means 
that the increase in margi nal costs is equal to the increase 
in HFCS price and is not possibly offset by lower prices 
of other inputs when higher retail prices reduce demand 
for the product.  
 
Monopoly: Constant Market Demand Elasticity  
 
  Assume only one firm in the market and the 
monopolist maximizes profits  P  by choosing quantity 
Q .  
 
  Max     = P(Q) Q-C(Q) P   (1)  
 
where  P(Q)  is the inverse demand curve (price is a 
function of quantity) and  C(Q)  is total cost as a fun ction 
of quantity.   
  The first order condition necessary for a profit 




  = P + Q
P
Q
  - 
C
Q





  (2 ) 
The first two terms are marginal revenue ( MR) and the 
last term is marginal cost ( MC).  Thus profit maximization 
requires the monopolist to set  Q so  that  MR=MC.  
 
  To analyze passing of an increase in marginal cost 
rewrite equation 2 as:    
  P +  Q
P
Q
  =  MC
¶
¶
  (3)  
Multiplying the second term on the left by  P/P gives:  Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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  P +  P 
P Q
Q P
  = MC
¶
¶
  (4)  








substitute  h into equation 4 gives:  
  P  -  P 
1
  = MC
h
  (5)  
solving for  P gives:  
  P  = 
1












  (6)  
Taking the derivative of  P with regard to  MC allows us to 
analyze the change in price that a monopolist must make 



















  (7)    
Given the fact that profit maximization monopolist always 
prices on the elastic portion of a market demand curve, 
i.e.,  h  > 1, the monopolist's rate of passi ng through is 
always greater than 1.  
 
Case 1.3 Oligopoly: Constant Market Demand Elasticity  
 
  One can generalize the above case to  n firms in a 
market where each firm maximizes its own profits and has 
same marginal cost structure.  The profit maximization  for 
firm  i can be expressed as:  
  i i i   = P(Q)  q   - c(q ) P   (8)  
here  Q is the market total demand and  i q  is the demand 
for firm  i.  C(q i ) is the firm's cost function. Firm  i 
differentiates with respect to quantity to obtain the first 




  =  P+
dP
dQ









￿   (9)  
with steps analogous to the monopoly case, this can be 
manipulated into:  
















  (10)  


















  (11)  
As long as th e number of firms  n>1 or the market 
demand elasticity of firm  i is greater than 1, the passing 
through rate is greater than one.  Note that if  n=1, one has 
the monopoly result.  Also note that for a given market 
demand elasticity,  h, price transmission is lower in an 
oligopoly that a monopoly. As  n approaches infinity, 
perfect competition, transmission converges from above 
to 100 percent.  
 
Case 1.4 Monopoly and Oligopoly: Non Constant 
Demand Elasticity  
 
  As Harris and Sul livan explain (p296), when market 
demand is linear, pass through by monopoly is less than 
100%.  This is also true for a firm in an oligopoly whose 
firm level demand curve is linear.  Less than 100% pass 
through occurs because linear demand becomes more 
el astic as price increases, thereby reducing the ability of 
the firm to pass on price increases.  The pass through 
properties of non constant elasticity demand curves can 
be analyzed in a more general fashion.  Specifically one 
can show that pass through of  100% or more does occur 
for a class of non constant elasticity demand curves.  To 
analyze the passing on effect under non constant demand 
elasticity, one can rewrite equation 5 as:  
  F(p,MC)  = P-
P
(P)
- MC = 0
h
  (12)  
Using implicit function theorem, the derivative  of  P with 



















  (13)  
The pass through rate is greater than one if the following Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
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  > 0
¶
¶
  (14)  
The above condition implies that, for the rate of pass 
through to be greater than one, the percenta ge change in 
elasticity should be less than the percentage change of 
price.  Thus the elasticity of the elasticity matters for the 
rate of pass through.  In the linear demand curve special 
case  ¶ ¶ h(p) / p  is very high and (14) does not hold.  
 
Case 2: Constrained Sales Maximization 
 
  A firm might choose to maximize its sales given that it 
earns a desired target level of profits.  Baumol (1972 
p.325 - 327) presents this type of model.  It fits retailers 
conduct when they undertake sales promotion camp aigns 
to expand market share, such as those documented in the 
soft drink industry (Progressive Grocer, 1992, p28; 1993, 
p88 - 89).  
 
Case 2.1  Competitive Market  
 
  In a competitive market, a firm's price is determined 
by market and it can not set any profit t arget for itself.  
There, sale maximization with a target level of profits 
does not exist in this market structure.  Alternatively the 
only sales maximization solution feasible is one with zero 
profits.  
Monopoly  
  Under this market structure, a firm maximiz es its 
revenue ( R) subject to the profit constraint:  
 
Max      R  = P(Q) Q
s.t.     P(Q) Q- MC Q = 
* P
  (15)  
here 
* P  is the target profit for the monopoly.  Therefore, 
one can rewrite the above equation as:  
Max R  P(Q)Q MC Q+  ( - P(Q) Q + MC Q) = - l P  
    (16)  
where  l is a  Lagrange multiplier.  To find the maximum, 
one differentiates equation 16 with regard to Lagrange 
multiplier as well as Q.  This gives the following first 





  =  - P(Q)Q+ MC Q = 0
*
l
P   (17)  
If marginal cost  MC increases from  1 MC   to  2 MC , then 
quantity  Q will decrease from  1 Q  to  2 Q . Furthermore, 
the profit target is binding both before and after the cost 




1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2   =  P Q - MC Q  =   P Q - MC Q P  
    (18)  
This translates in to:  
 
    ( P - MC )Q  = ( P - C )Q
  P - MC
P - MC
  = 
Q
Q
  < 1
  P - MC   >  P - MC
  P - P   > MC - MC




  > 1





2 2 1 1






  (19)  
Therefore, the passing through rate is greater than one.  
 
Case 2.2 Oligopoly  
 
  The above analysis can be easily generalized to a n 
firm oligopoly.  If each firm sets its own profit target and 
these profit targets are binding  before and after any cost 
change, then each firm should have the similar first order 
condition as in equation 20.  Therefore, after a derivation 
similar to the one above, one obtains a pass through rate 
greater than one.   
 
Case 2.3 Loss Leader  
 
  A loss lea der strategy is simply a constrained sales 
maximization strategy with a negative profit rate.  Thus 
the analyses in cases 2.1 and 2.2 cover the loss leader 
strategy.  Estimation of Cost Pass Through  Ronald W. Cotterill 
 
 




Table A1 Estimated Pass Through Rates for Soft Drinks *  
 
                Private   Average  
  Coke   Pepsi   RC   Dr. Pepper   Sprite   Seven - Up   Mt. Dew    Label   Rate  
 
P  3.7082   3.6484   3.3122   3.9696   3.6212   3.7241   3.8813   2.3436  
MP  0.0371   0.0365   0.0331   0.0397   0.0362   0.0372   0.0388   0.0234  
MlnP   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01   0.01  
S old   0.2527   0.2427   0.0187   0.0399   0.0 412   0.0497   0.0341   0.0801  
gii  - 0.3638   - 0.4461   - 0.0598   - 0.0515   - 0.0666   - 0.1058   - 0.0454   - 0.1067  
MS   - 0.003638   - 0.004461   - 0.000598   - 0.000515   - 0.000666   - 0.001058   - 0.000454   - 0.001067  
S new   0.2491   0.2382   0.0181   0.0394   0.0405   0.0486   0.0036   0.0790  
Mh  0.02081   0.03472   0.10601   0.01638   0.02672   0.04818   0.01981   0.01855  




  107%   93%   73%   114%   98%   85%   107%   110%   100%  
 
* This table is based on 1 percent change in the price and uses results from Ta ble A5 in Cotterill, Franklin, and Ma (1996).  P stands 
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